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DO NOT FEED THE HOMELESS:  ONE OF
THE MEANEST CITIES FOR THE
HOMELESS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
PUNISHES THE SO-
CALLED “ENABLERS”1
D. Matthew Lay*
I. INTRODUCTION
Huntridge Subdivision is a 4000-acre residential neighborhood in the City
of Las Vegas.2  Built in 1941, the subdivision was one of the first of many
subdivisions in the Las Vegas Valley.3  Constructed by the developers of the
Huntridge Subdivision, Huntridge Circle Park is centrally located within the
Huntridge Subdivision and sits on a three-acre oval median between the north
and southbound lanes of traffic on Maryland Parkway.4  The developers of
Huntridge Subdivision deeded Huntridge Circle Park to the City of Las Vegas
in 1942.  Since 1967, the park has consisted of a grassy area lined with trees,
lights, and several parking spaces.5  Because the park was nestled between the
lanes of traffic on a heavily traveled roadway, residents of the surrounding
Huntridge Subdivision were hesitant to access, or allow their children to access,
the park by crossing Maryland Parkway.6  Moreover, by 2002, the City, and
many of the residents of the surrounding neighborhood, believed that vagrants
had taken over the park.7  Thus, in 2001, the City created a Circle Park Steering
Committee (“Steering Committee”) to prepare a plan to renovate the park.8
* William S. Boyd School of Law, J.D. candidate, May 2008; M.A., University of Nevada,
Las Vegas, 2005; B.A., University of Puget Sound, 1999.  The author thanks Rochelle T.
Nguyen and Samuel G. Bateman for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier
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1 See THE NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS AND THE NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS
& POVERTY, A DREAM DENIED:  THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 30
(2006), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/report.pdf.
2 Agenda Item No. 77:  Discussion and Possible Action Regarding the Status, Uses and
Other Related Matters of Huntridge Circle Park Located at 1251 South Maryland Park-
way—Ward 3 (Reese), City of Las Vegas, City Council Meeting (June 21, 2006) [hereinafter
City Council Meeting, June 21, 2006] (Huntridge Circle Park:  History/Background).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.  The Circle Park Steering Committee prepared and conducted a survey targeted at
residents residing within a one-half mile radius of Huntridge Circle Park. Id.  Twenty per-
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Based on recommendations made by the Steering Committee, the City of
Las Vegas undertook an approximately $1.5 million dollar renovation of Hun-
tridge Circle Park.9  The improvements included a grass amphitheater replete
with shaded outdoor stage and grassy seating area, community perennial gar-
den, jogging path, restrooms, landscaping, and children’s play areas with water
features and safety barriers.10  Moreover, the City of Las Vegas installed traffic
controlled pedestrian crosswalks to facilitate access to the park.11  Neverthe-
less, the City contends that despite these improvements, the presence of
vagrants in the park continues to deter residents of the surrounding neighbor-
hood from enjoying the park.12  Moreover, the City maintains that area
residents have expressed concern regarding the impact of vagrants in Huntridge
Circle Park on the surrounding neighborhoods.13  Thus, at a City Council meet-
ing on June 21, 2006, the City of Las Vegas held a public discussion in order to
“suggest certain action that could be taken in order to ameliorate the issues that
were affecting the neighborhood and at the same time address the social issues
attendant with problems of homelessness.”14  As a result, the City of Las Vegas
enacted Las Vegas Municipal Code (“LVMC”) 13.36.055(a)(6), which prohib-
ited feeding the “indigent” in city parks.15
The American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada (“ACLUN”) challenged
the ordinance, arguing that it was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.16
The ACLUN argued that the City of Las Vegas would enforce LVMC
13.36.055(a)(6) selectively and thereby violate the rights of both the indigent,
as defined by the ordinance, and those who sought to provide the indigent with
services, such as meals.17
cent of those surveyed by the Steering Committee responded to they survey. Id.  Those who
responded cited four areas of concern, including:  “[h]omeless sleeping in the park and
related criminal activity”; “[s]afety due to vehicle traffic”; “[l]andscaping:  more trees and
shrubs with less grass”; and “[l]ack of activities for children.” Id.
9 Id.  The City of Las Vegas committed $870,000, and Clark County committed $600,000 to
the renovation project. Id.  Huntridge Circle Park was closed from February 2, 2003, to
November 13, 2003. Id.  (LVMPD Crime Data).
10 Id. (Huntridge Circle Park:  History/Background); id. (Huntridge Circle Park Conceptual
Plan); id. Verbatim Excerpt, at 7 (testimony of Orlando Sanchez, Deputy City Manager).
11 City Council Meeting, June 21, 2006, supra note 2 (Huntridge Circle Park:  History/
Background).
12 Id. Verbatim Excerpt, at 7 (testimony of Orlando Sanchez, Deputy City Manager).
13 City Council Meeting, June 21, 2006, supra note 2 (Huntridge Circle Park:  History/
Background); id. Verbatim Excerpt, at 7 (testimony of Orlando Sanchez, Deputy City
Manager).
14 Id. Verbatim Excerpt, at 3 (testimony of Oscar Goodman, Mayor).
15 LAS VEGAS, NEV., MUN. CODE § 13.36.055(a)(6) (2006); see Agenda Item No. 57:  Bill
No. 2006-37 – ABEYANCE ITEM – Prohibits Within City Parks the Providing of Food or
Meals as Would Typically Be Provided in a Rescue Mission or Shelter for the Homeless,
Proposed by:  Bradford R. Jerbic, City Attorney, City of Las Vegas, City Council Meeting
(July 19, 2006) [hereinafter City Council Meeting, July 19, 2006].
16 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Enjoining the
Enforcement of LVMC 13.36.055(a)(6) and for an Expedited Hearing at 1-9, Sacco v. City
of Las Vegas, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Motion for
Preliminary Injunction].  In January of 2007, the District Court issued a Permanent Injunc-
tion against LVMC 13.36.055. See Sacco v. Las Vegas, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL (D.
Nev. Jan. 26, 2007) (order granting preliminary injunction).
17 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 16, at 23.
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The ACLUN challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance on five
grounds in Sacco v. City of Las Vegas.18  First, the ACLUN argued that the
ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.19  Sec-
ond, the plaintiffs claimed that the ordinance violated the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment.20  Third, the ACLUN asserted a “hybrid” rights claim,
which implicated the plaintiffs’ rights to religion and free speech.21  Fourth, the
plaintiffs contended that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because it made criminal the act of associating with
certain people who appeared to be indigent.22  Finally, the ACLUN claimed
that the City’s ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to pro-
vide reasonable notice of prohibited conduct.23  Ultimately, the plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the City from enforcing the ordinance.24
This Note contends that the Sacco court failed to apply the four-part test
for conduct combining elements of speech and non-speech elucidated by the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. O’Brien.25  Instead, the Sacco
court invalidated the ordinance for vagueness and Equal Protection reasons26
and correctly decided that the ordinance failed constitutional analysis as a time,
place, and manner restriction because the ordinance was not narrowly tailored
to serve a significant government interest.27  However, the court erred in find-
ing the ordinance to be content-neutral, and, thus, the Sacco court misapplied
Ward’s test for content neutrality.
Part II of this Note details the Las Vegas ordinance criminalizing those
groups and individuals that feed the homeless in a Las Vegas city park.  This
Part also explores the events giving rise to the enactment of the ordinance by
the City of Las Vegas and profiles the various plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ groups
involved in the litigation.  Part III of this Note details the lawsuit, including
arguments proffered by the ACLUN and the City of Las Vegas.  Additionally,
18 Sacco, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL (order granting preliminary injunction).
19 Id. at 11.
20 Id. at 15.  Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that because of religious and political con-
notations associated with the act of providing food, in this case, feeding the homeless is a
symbolic form of speech.  Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 16, at 10.  Moreo-
ver, the ACLUN alleged that the ordinance is content-based because the City disagreed with
these religious and political messages. Id. at 13. Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that the
ordinance was neither a valid time, place, or manner restriction, nor was the ordinance nar-
rowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest. Id. at 14-15.  Furthermore, the
plaintiffs argued that the ordinance did not provide adequate alternative avenues for commu-
nication. Id. at 18.
21 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 16, at 20.  The plaintiffs argued that the
district court ought to subject the ordinance to strict scrutiny, where the ordinance would
ultimately fail to satisfy a time, place, and manner analysis.  Id.  In the alternative, the
ACLUN argued that even if the district court determined that the ordinance was content-
neutral, in a hybrid rights claim, or one involving both a free exercise claim and an addi-
tional constitutionally protected right, strict scrutiny still applies. Id.
22 Id. at 21.
23 Id. at 26.
24 Id. at 30.
25 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
26 Sacco v. Las Vegas, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL, at 6-7 (D. Nev. Jan. 26, 2007) (order
granting preliminary injunction).
27 Id. at 19, 21.
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it reviews the district court’s holding that the ordinance is unconstitutionally
vague and fails the rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.28  Furthermore, this Part analyzes in detail the dis-
trict court’s holding, concluding that while the district court reached the correct
decision, ruling the ordinance unconstitutional, it erred in ruling that the ordi-
nance did not violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.29
II. BACKGROUND:  THE ORDINANCE AND THE O’BRIEN TEST
A. Las Vegas Municipal Code 13.36.055(a)(6) and Subsequent Civil
Disobedience
Previously, the City of Las Vegas attempted to exert control over the park
by enforcing ordinances targeted at those who frequented the City’s parks.
Homeless activists claimed that Las Vegas enforced laws that “other people
would not be arrested for, such as sitting at a bus stop with no money in their
pocket, or for jaywalking.”30  Before passing the ordinance, the City announced
a plan to place mentally ill homeless people in mental health hospitals for
involuntary seventy-two-hour evaluations.31  Ultimately, however, it acknowl-
edged that area mental health facilities were not sufficiently equipped to serve
every homeless person in need under the City’s plan.32  In the weeks preceding
passage of the ordinance, Las Vegas more aggressively enforced laws address-
ing the perceived ill-effects of the homeless in Huntridge Circle Park, citing
those who entered the park before it opened at 7:00 a.m. and those who tres-
passed on private property.33  The City’s ordinance regulating park hours reads
in pertinent part:
Except when action by the City Manager has established different hours of closure of
certain of the City’s parks pursuant to Section 13.36.110, all of the City’s parks shall
be open to the public between the hours of seven a.m. and nine p.m. and during such
other hours as may be appropriate to accommodate events or activities which are
sponsored by the Department.34
Las Vegas made at least one other attempt to criminalize activity it per-
ceived as enabling the homeless.  A city ordinance made it illegal for any per-
son to have a gathering of over twenty-five people without a permit.35  The
City’s group-use ordinance reads in pertinent part:
Any person who desires to use any park or recreational facility of the City for a group
of twenty-five individuals or more, or any person who desires to conduct some event
in which it could reasonably be assumed that twenty-five or more persons might
gather at a park or recreational facility of the City to participate in or witness such
28 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.”).
29 Id. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”).
30 Francisca Ortega, Las Vegas Makes It Illegal to Feed Homeless in Parks, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, July 20, 2006 (on file with the Nevada Law Journal).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 David McGrath Schwartz, Feeding Homeless Outlawed:  ACLU Calls Measure Unen-
forceable, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 20, 2006, at 1A.
34 LAS VEGAS, NEV., MUN. CODE § 13.36.120 (2006).
35 Ortega, supra note 30.
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event, shall first apply and obtain a permit from the Director.  This Section does not
apply to any event which is sponsored by the Department.36
The group-use ordinance allows law enforcement officers to bar visitors to the
park unilaterally for specified periods.37  Police and Las Vegas city marshals
cited homeless advocate and eventual litigant Gail Sacco on at least two occa-
sions for violating the group-use ordinance.38
On July 19, 2006, the Las Vegas City Council unanimously voted to pass
an ordinance making it illegal to provide the indigent with food in a city park.39
Las Vegas Municipal Code 13.36.055(a)(6) reads in pertinent part:
(A)  The following are prohibited within any City park: . . . (6) The providing of food
or meals to the indigent for free or for a nominal fee.  For purposes of this Paragraph,
an indigent person is a person whom a reasonable ordinary person would believe to
be entitled to apply for or receive assistance under NRS Chapter 428.40
A conviction under the ordinance carries a maximum penalty of a $1000 fine
and/or six months in jail.41
Nevada Revised Statute (“NRS”) 428.030, which the City feeding ordi-
nance incorporates because it provides eligibility standards for indigent relief,
reads in pertinent part:
When any person meets the uniform standards of eligibility established by the board
of county commissioners or by NRS 439B.310, if applicable, and complies with any
requirements imposed pursuant to NRS 428.040, he is entitled to receive such relief
as is in accordance with the policies and standards established and approved by the
board of county commissioners and within the limits of the money which may be
lawfully appropriated pursuant to NRS 428.050, 428.285 and 450.425 for this
purpose.42
Thus, the Nevada Revised Statutes, and, therefore, the City of Las Vegas,
define an indigent person as anyone who is “entitled to receive . . . relief.”43
Some questioned the ordinance’s constitutionality.  Allen Lichtenstein, an
attorney with the ACLUN, questioned how it would be possible to determine,
“without a financial statement,” whether a person was poor.44  In response,
Mayor Oscar Goodman argued that “[c]ertain truths are self-evident . . . [y]ou
know who’s homeless.”45  Lichtenstein also questioned the possible applica-
tions of the City’s proposed ordinance, asking whether the City could fine a
person for serving “[t]hose who get . . . assistance” at a picnic.46  Others ques-
tioned the City’s motive in drafting and enacting the ordinance.  Gary Peck,
36 LAS VEGAS, NEV., MUN. CODE § 13.36.080.
37 Randal C. Archibold, Please Don’t Feed Homeless in Parks, Las Vegas Says in Ordi-
nance, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at A18.
38 Schwartz, supra note 33.
39 City Council Meeting, July 19, 2006, supra note 15, Verbatim Excerpt, at 5.  City
Councilwoman Lois Tarkanian did not attend this portion of the July 19, 2006 meeting and
therefore did not vote on the ordinance. Id.
40 LAS VEGAS, NEV., MUN. CODE § 13.36.055.
41 Id. § 1.24.010.
42 NEV. REV. STAT. § 428.030 (2005).
43 Id.
44 Ortega, supra note 30.
45 Schwartz, supra note 33.
46 Id.
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executive director of the ACLUN, believed that the City “[was] trying to figure
out ways of making homeless invisible or kicking them out of our commu-
nity.”47  Lichtenstein claimed that the City was trying to “make war on poor
people.”48  Regarding a threatened lawsuit from the ACLUN, Mayor Good-
man, a former criminal defense attorney, declared, “For 35 years, I represented
reputed mobsters and was never afraid to go to court . . . and I am not afraid to
go to court against the A.C.L.U.”49
At high noon on August 10, 2006, Patrick Band, a social activist from
Santa Rosa, California, entered into a showdown with the City of Las Vegas.50
Band was in Las Vegas to protest LVMC 13.36.055(a)(6)51 and was one of
approximately one hundred other protesters.52  Band carried signs and chanted
as part of the formal protest.53  Later, Band moved across the street to the
City’s Frank Wright Plaza, where he provided several individuals with free
food and drink.54  Then, Band moved on to another city park, Huntridge Circle
Park, where he again provided a number of people with free food and drink.55
Ultimately, however, a Las Vegas marshal cited Band for “willfully [and]
unlawfully provid[ing] food or meals to one or more indigent people while
within the confines of Huntridge Circle Park,” a misdemeanor.56  Additionally,
the marshal warned Band for carrying a “weapon” in the park, in this case a
“pocketknife tool,” which Band used for “slicing bread, opening boxes, and
assisting in other necessary food-sharing activities.”57
On that same day, Robert Edmonds, another social advocate from Santa
Rosa, California, joined others in protesting LVMC 13.36.055(a)(6).  Like
Band, Edmonds participated in the formal protest by chanting and carrying a
sign.58  Edmonds videotaped all of the signage in Huntridge Circle Park59 and
noted that none of the signage indicated that it was illegal to share food and
water.60  Nevertheless, Edmonds also received a misdemeanor citation from a
Las Vegas marshal for “willfully [and] unlawfully provid[ing] food or meals to
one or more indigent people while within the confines of Huntridge Circle
Park.”61
47 Id.
48 Archibold, supra note 37.
49 Id.
50 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 16, at Exhibit 2 (declaration of Patrick
Band).
51 Id.
52 Id. (declaration of Gail Sacco, Sept. 28, 2006).
53 Id. (declaration of Patrick Band).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. (Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Event # 20060810-0040, Citation
#03718538, Aug. 10, 2006).
57 Id.; see also id. (declaration of Patrick Band).
58 Id. (declaration of Robert Edmonds).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. (Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Event # 20060810-0040, Citation
#03799804, Aug. 10, 2006).
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Band and Edmonds are members of Sonoma County Food Not Bombs, a
social advocacy group.62  Food Not Bombs is a self-described “revolutionary
movement[ ],” through which “hundreds of autonomous chapters shar[e] free
vegetarian food with hungry people and protest[ ] war and poverty.”63  Moreo-
ver, members of Food Not Bombs argue that “[b]y spending money on bombs
instead of food, our government perpetuates and exacerbates the violence of
poverty by failing to provide food for everyone in need.”64  Indeed, individual
members of Food Not Bombs “do not give food without protesting nor protest
without giving food.”65  Band argues that access to food and water as well as
his ability to share food and water are civil rights.66  Additionally, Band and
Edmonds were “disturbed” by the precedent set by an ordinance that criminal-
ized the act of assisting those “most in need.”67  Moreover, Band and Edmonds
both believed that their activities on August 10, 2006, were forms of political
speech aimed at “highlighting the disparity between those who have access to
food resources and those who do not.”68  Thus, the two activists believed that
they owed a political duty “to speak out against [the] ordinance.”69
Homeless advocate Gail Sacco argued that initially she did not engage in
protest or community building activities as a form of political protest.70
Rather, Sacco claims that she “just wanted to make sure people [were] fed.”71
However, Sacco contends that the City’s response to the problem of homeless-
ness is a political act of oppression manifested by the practice of housing the
homeless in jail for non-violent offenses and by criminalizing the act of provid-
ing assistance to those in need.72  As a result, Sacco’s activism has become
more political, and she now participates in protests related to all aspects of
homelessness.73  For example, on October 13, 2006, Sacco fed approximately
fifteen individuals at Huntridge Circle Park.74  Individuals at the park informed
Sacco that Las Vegas city marshals had been milling around the park for
approximately twenty minutes that afternoon.75  At approximately 3:00 p.m.,
62 Id. (declaration of Patrick Band); id. (declaration of Robert Edmonds).
63 The Food Not Bombs Story, http://www.foodnotbombs.net/story.html (last visited Mar.
3, 2008).
64 C.T. BUTLER & KEITH MCHENRY, FOOD NOT BOMBS (20th anniversary ed. 2000)
(excerpts from this book are available at http://www.foodnotbombs.net/bookpolitics.html).
65 Sacco v. City of Las Vegas, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL, at 5, 17 (D. Nev. Jan. 26,
2007) (order granting preliminary injunction).
66 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 16, at Exhibit 2 (declaration of Patrick
Band).
67 Id. (declaration of Patrick Band); id. (declaration of Robert Edmonds).
68 Id. (declaration of Patrick Band); id. (declaration of Robert Edmonds).
69 Id. (declaration of Patrick Band); id. (declaration of Robert Edmonds).
70 Id. (declaration of Gail Sacco, Sept. 28, 2006).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. (declaration of Gail Sacco, Oct. 15, 2006).
75 Id.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-2\NVJ208.txt unknown Seq: 8  1-APR-08 13:15
Winter 2008] DO NOT FEED THE HOMELESS 747
Sacco claimed Las Vegas city marshals “stormed” the park.76  Sacco was
detained, searched, and ultimately cited for feeding indigent people.77
Sacco argued that, in light of other ordinances that the City has enforced
against its homeless population, the ordinance prohibiting the act of feeding the
indigent has made obeying the ordinance virtually impossible:
Some Marshals told me that I wouldn’t be in trouble for the same thing (25 people in
line); some Marshals told me they would only enforce the permit issue if I had more
than 25 people in a single table group; other Marshals told me if I had more than 25
people in the whole park, they would enforce the law; and some Marshals [told me] if
there were more than 25 people eating off of the same type of paper plate, which is a
cheap, generic paper plate, then I would be cited.  So you can see I never know when
I will be ticketed for giving out food, so I just stay out of the parks.78
Anecdotally, Sacco argued the ordinance has had a chilling effect on the ability
of service providers to assist the homeless.79  Thus, she claimed that because
they feared that those receiving assistance could not afford a one-thousand dol-
lar citation, some providers have discontinued the practice of feeding the
homeless.80
B. Jurisprudential Background
1. Conduct Combining Speech and Non-Speech Elements
When a course of conduct combines speech and non-speech elements, the
state may justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms support-
ing a sufficiently important government interest in regulating the non-speech
element.81  In United States v. O’Brien, O’Brien was indicted, tried, convicted,
and sentenced for violating the Youth Corrections Act when he burned his
Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of the South Boston
Courthouse.82  The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the regula-
tion prohibiting the mutilation or destruction of the Selective Service registra-
tion certificates was an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment right
to free speech and served no legitimate legislative purpose.83  Thus, the United
States Supreme Court elucidated a test for determining whether a government
regulation is sufficiently justified in limiting First Amendment freedoms to sup-
port an important government interest in regulating a non-speech element.84  A
government regulation is sufficiently justified if (1) it is within the constitu-
tional power of the government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial gov-
76 Id.
77 Id. (Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Event # 20061013-0047, Citation
#03800379, Oct. 13, 2006).
78 Id. (declaration of Gail Sacco, Sept. 28, 2006); see LAS VEGAS, NEV., MUN. CODE
§ 13.36.080 (2006).
79 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 16, at Exhibit 2 (declaration of Gail Sacco,
Sept. 28, 2006).
80 Id.
81 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
82 Id. at 369 & n.2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (1982) (repealed 1984).
83 O’Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538, 541 (1st Cir. 1967); see O’Brien, 391 U.S. at
370, 386; see also 50 U.S.C. § 462(b) (1964) (omitted by amendment 1973).
84 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-2\NVJ208.txt unknown Seq: 9  1-APR-08 13:15
748 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:740
ernmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amend-
ment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that inter-
est.85  Finally, the Court held that the court of appeals erred and reinstated the
judgment and sentence of the district court.86
2. Public Forum Jurisprudence
The state may regulate the “time, place, and manner” of expression only
with regulations that are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a signif-
icant government interest, and provide “ample alternative channels of commu-
nication.”87  In Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, the
Court delineated three types of government property:  public forums, limited
public forums, and non-public forums.88  Public forums “have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.”89  Limited public forums encompass public prop-
erty, which the state has “opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity.”90  Forums are not public by “tradition or designation.”91
A city must allow free speech on public property, even if the city incurs a
financial burden as a result.92  In Schneider v. New Jersey, the Court consid-
ered whether four separate municipal ordinances violated the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment.93  Three of the four ordinances essentially pro-
hibited citizens from distributing handbills on public property.94  The Court
held that “[a]ny burden imposed upon the city . . . in cleaning and caring for the
streets as an indirect consequence of such distribution results from the constitu-
tional protection of the freedom of speech and press.”95  Moreover, the Court
noted that despite the constitutional protection afforded to citizens by the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment, a city was not without power to pre-
vent littering.96  Thus, a city could cite its citizens for littering, rather than
engaging in a scheme that infringed upon its citizens constitutionally protected
free speech rights.97
Moreover, the use of public places is a “privilege[ ], immunit[y], right[ ],
and libert[y] of citizens.”98  In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organiza-
85 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
86 Id. at 386.
87 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
88 Id. at 45, 46 & n.7.
89 Id. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 46.
92 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939); see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1125 (3d ed. 2006) (“Schneider is important
because it established that a city must allow speech on its property even if doing so will
impose costs on the city.”).
93 Schneider, 308 U.S. at 153-54.
94 Id. at 154-57.
95 Id. at 162.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.).
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tion, the Court considered whether a city ordinance, which required that citi-
zens obtain a permit from the Director of Public Safety in order to assemble on
public property within the city limits, including streets, highways, parks, or
buildings, violated the First Amendment.99  Various individuals and unincorpo-
rated labor unions alleged that the Director of Public Safety, acting in concert
with other city authorities, prevented the Committee for Industrial Organization
from explaining the National Labor Relations Act to the city’s workers.100
There is no absolute privilege to use public spaces, and the use of public space
must conform to the bounds of general comfort and convenience.  However, a
government may not abridge or deny the privilege under the “guise of regula-
tion.”101  Thus, because the regulation requiring a permit for assembly on pub-
lic property had the potential to “be made the instrument of arbitrary
suppression of free expression,” the regulation was unconstitutional on its
face.102
A legislature must narrowly tailor a regulation of the time, place, or man-
ner of protected speech to serve the government’s legitimate content-neutral
interests, but a regulation need not be the least restrictive or intrusive means of
doing so.103  In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, New York City attempted to
regulate the volume of amplified music at an amphitheater and stage structure
in a manner that would neither diminish the sonic quality of the performance
nor intrude upon those who resided in surrounding neighborhoods.104  Thus,
the regulation required performers at the City’s bandshell to use sound-amplifi-
cation equipment and a sound technician provided by the City.105  The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the City’s regulation was not the least-
intrusive means of achieving a legitimate purpose.106  The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City’s regulation was narrowly tai-
lored to serve “the substantial and content-neutral governmental interests of
avoiding excessive sound volume and proving sufficient amplification within
the bandshell concert ground . . . .”107  Moreover, the Court found that the
regulation left numerous channels of communication open.108  Ultimately, the
Supreme Court held that the court of appeals failed to defer to the City’s rea-
sonable determination that its interest in controlling volume would be best
served by requiring performers to utilize the City’s sound technician.109
99 Id. at 502 n.1, 503.
100 Id. at 500-03.
101 Id. at 515-16.
102 Id. at 516.
103 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
104 Id. at 784.
105 Id.
106 Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 1988).  Specifically, the
appellate court found that while the City’s guideline was “valid only to the extent necessary
to achieve the city’s legitimate interest in controlling excessive volume, but found there were
various alternative means of controlling volume without also intruding on respondent’s abil-
ity to control the sound mix.”  Ward, 491 U.S. at 789. The City could have “directed
respondent’s sound technician to keep the volume below specified levels,” installed a vol-
ume-limiting device, or even pulled the plug to enforce the volume limit. Id.
107 Ward, 491 U.S. at 803.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 800.
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A government may subject expression, which incorporates speech ele-
ments, non-speech elements, or both, to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.110  For example, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, the Court considered whether a National Park Service (“NPS”) regula-
tion, which prohibited camping in certain Washington D.C. parks, violated the
First Amendment because it prohibited demonstrators from sleeping in the park
as a form of protest.111  The demonstrators sought to call attention to the plight
of the homeless.112  Although the NPS issued a permit to the Community for
Creative Non-Violence (“CCNV”) to conduct demonstrations in two different
parks, consisting of two “symbolic tent cities,” the NPS denied CCNV’s
request to permit sleeping in the symbolic tents.113  The Court held that the
NPS regulation was a valid time, place, and manner restriction.114  The regula-
tion was content neutral, narrowly-focused on the government’s “substantial
interest in maintaining the parks . . . in an attractive and intact condition,” and
left sufficient communication alternatives because the regulation “otherwise
left the demonstration intact.”115
A state may not prohibit the use of property traditionally open for expres-
sive purposes because of the content of the proposed expression, but the state
may impose reasonable “time, place, and manner” restrictions on the use of
public property.116  In Cox v. New Hampshire, the Court considered whether a
New Hampshire statute prohibiting “parade or procession” on a public street
without a special license violated the Constitution.117  A New Hampshire
municipal court convicted sixty-eight Jehovah’s Witnesses of violating the stat-
ute.118  Specifically, the Jehovah’s Witnesses assembled at a hall, split into
groups of twenty, and marched in single file order through the business district
distributing leaflets.119  The Jehovah’s Witnesses never applied for a permit,
and the city never issued one.120  The Court construed the challenged regula-
tion narrowly, holding that the regulation required only organized formations to
obtain a permit in order to use the highway.121  Thus, the small groups of Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses did not fall under the statute’s contemplation.122
In sum, a government may regulate the “time, place, and manner” of
expression with content-neutral government regulations.  These regulations
must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and pro-
vide “ample alternative channels of communication,”123 but they need not be
110 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
111 Id. at 291.
112 Id. at 291-92.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 297.
115 Id. at 295-96.
116 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
117 Id. at 570-71.
118 Id. at 570.
119 Id. at 572.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 575.
122 Id. at 576.
123 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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the least restrictive or intrusive means of doing so.124  Moreover, a city govern-
ment must allow free speech on public property, even if the city incurs a finan-
cial burden as a result.125
3. Determining Whether a Regulation is Content-Based or Content-
Neutral
Content-based laws, or laws compelling speakers to utter or distribute
speech of a particular message, are subject to the most exacting scrutiny.126
Content-neutral regulations, or those unrelated to the content of speech, are
subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.127  The “principal inquiry in deter-
mining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regula-
tion of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”128  In
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court considered whether a fed-
eral regulation, which required cable television providers to carry a specified
number of local commercial broadcast television channels, violated the First
Amendment.129  The Court found the regulation to be content neutral because it
“impose[d] burdens and confer[red] benefits without reference to the content of
speech.”130
Moreover, a state may not exclude citizens from a forum “generally open
to the public, even if it was not required to create the forum in the first
place.”131  In Widmar v. Vincent, the Supreme Court considered whether a state
university, which provided a public forum to registered student groups, may
exclude a registered student group from using its facilities based upon the relig-
ious content of the student group’s speech.132  The Court held that when a state
discriminates against a citizen based on the content of his or her speech, it must
demonstrate that the regulation is “necessary to serve a compelling state inter-
est and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”133  Thus, the Supreme
Court will subject any content-based regulation to review under the strict scru-
tiny standard.
Similarly, a state may not impose “special prohibitions” on speakers
whose views it disfavors.134  In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court considered
whether a city ordinance could prohibit otherwise permitted speech solely
based on the subjects addressed by the speech.135  The Court held that content-
based regulations are “presumptively invalid,” and thus the Court will subject
124 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
125 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92,
at 1125 (“Schneider is important because it established that a city must allow speech on its
property even if doing so will impose costs on the city.”).
126 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
127 Id.
128 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
129 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 630.
130 Id. at 643.
131 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 (1981).
132 Id. at 264-65.
133 Id. at 270.
134 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
135 Id. at 381.
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such regulations to strict scrutiny.136  The Court also applied strict scrutiny to
state regulations that discriminated against certain types of speech on the basis
of viewpoint, in addition to content-based regulations.137  Thus, the Court held
that First Amendment forbids “selective limitations upon speech,” or those that
discriminate on the basis of content, viewpoint, or both.138
A content-based regulation is content-neutral when motivated by a permis-
sible content-neutral purpose, such as the secondary effects of the speech on the
surrounding community.139  In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the
Court considered whether a municipal zoning ordinance violated the First
Amendment.140  The ordinance prohibited adult theaters from locating “within
1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church,
park, or school.”141  The Court found that the Renton ordinance did not con-
template the content of the films, but rather the secondary effects of theaters
exhibiting adult motion pictures on the surrounding community.142  Specifi-
cally, the Renton ordinance sought to remediate the alleged “harmful” and
“adverse” symptoms caused by the presence of adult motion pictures in the
community, based solely upon studies detailing the effects of the presence in
similar theaters in the City of Seattle, Washington.143  Ultimately, the Court
held that Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences of other cities in estab-
lishing a legislative history for the ordinance, “so long as whatever evidence
the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the
city addresses.”144  Moreover, because the Court characterized the Renton ordi-
nance as a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation, the Court ulti-
mately determined that Renton designed the ordinance to serve a substantial
governmental interest and did not limit unreasonably alternative avenues of
communication.145
136 Id. at 382.
137 Id. at 395-96.
138 Id. at 392.
139 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). But see CHEMERIN-
SKY, supra note 92, at 937 (“The Renton approach seems to confuse whether a law is con-
tent-based or content–neutral with the question of whether a law is justified by a sufficient
purpose.  The law may have been properly upheld as needed to combat crime and the secon-
dary effects of adult theaters, but it nonetheless was clearly content-based:  It applied only to
theaters showing films with sexually explicit content.”).
140 Renton, 475 U.S. at 43.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 47.
143 Id. at 50-52.
144 Id. at 51-52.
145 Id. at 50.
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III. ANALYSIS: SACCO VS. THE PREVAILING
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
A. Sacco v. City of Las Vegas
The ACLUN represented plaintiffs Band, Edmonds, and Sacco, among
others, in a federal civil action.146  The ACLUN argued that LVMC
13.36.055(a)(6) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.147  Moreover, the
ACLUN argued that the ordinance asked “ordinary” members of the public to
engage in a form of profiling aimed at preventing “indigent” members of the
community from receiving any food in order to prevent offending the City’s
ordinance.148  Thus, the City prevented both the public from giving food to
“old people . . . on assistance,” and “[s]chools, camps and after school pro-
grams that include poor children” from “handing out any cookies during any
excursion to a City park.”149  Therefore, the ACLUN contended that the
defendants, in order to enforce the ordinance in a way that avoided preventing
harm to families, the elderly, and the young, required police and marshals to
enforce LVMC 13.36.055(a)(6) selectively.150  Moreover, the ACLUN argued
that because it criminalized feeding the indigent, an essentially religious
expressive act for the litigants, the ordinance was unconstitutional.151  Thus,
the ACLUN feared that the City, through a scheme of selective enforcement,
violated the rights of both the indigent, as defined by the ordinance, and those
who sought to provide services, including meals, to the poor.
The ACLUN alleged that the ordinance was unconstitutional for five dis-
tinct reasons.  First, the ACLUN averred that the ordinance violated the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.152  Second, the plaintiffs alleged that
the ordinance violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.153
Third, the ACLUN asserted a “hybrid” rights claim, which implicated the
plaintiffs’ rights to religion and free speech.154  Fourth, the plaintiffs argued
146 Complaint, Sacco v. City of Las Vegas, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL (D. Nev. June 12,
2006).
147 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 16, at 1.
148 Id. at 1-2.
149 Id. at 2.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1.
152 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech
. . . .”).
153 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 16, at 10.  Specifically, the plaintiffs
claimed that because of religious and political connotations associated with the act of provid-
ing food, in this case feeding the homeless is a symbolic form of speech. Id.  Moreover, the
ACLUN alleged that the ordinance is content based because the City disagreed with these
religious and political messages. Id. at 13.  Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that the ordi-
nance was neither a valid time, place, or manner restriction, nor was the ordinance narrowly
tailored to serve a substantial government interest. Id. at 18.  Furthermore, the plaintiffs
argued that the ordinance did not provide adequate alternative avenues for communication.
Id. at 14-15.
154 Id. at 20.  The plaintiffs argued that the district court ought to subject the ordinance to
strict scrutiny, where the ordinance would ultimately fail to satisfy the time, place, and man-
ner analysis enunciated in O’Brien v. United States. Id.  In the alternative, the ACLUN
argued that even if the district court determined that the ordinance was content-neutral, in a
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that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it made criminal the act of associating with certain people
who appeared to be poor.155  Finally, the ACLUN claimed that the City’s ordi-
nance was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to provide reasonable
notice of prohibited conduct.156  Ultimately, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
City from enforcing the ordinance.157
On January 26, 2007, United States District Judge Robert Jones issued an
order declaring LVMC section 13.36.055(a)(6) unconstitutional as written.158
The district court held that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because
a person of ordinary intelligence was unlikely to be clear about exactly which
conduct the ordinance prohibits.159  Specifically, the court found that in order
to determine whether the ordinance proscribes certain conduct, the potential
violator and the potential arresting officer must undertake two subjective
tasks.160  First, the potential violator must venture a guess as to whether the
person with whom the potential violator is sharing food is indigent, as defined
by statute.161  Second, the potential arresting officer must determine a potential
violator’s state of mind in providing food to another.162  Thus, the court found
that this second subjective determination required of an arresting officer invited
“arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” of the ordinance.163
Furthermore, the court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional
because it failed rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.164  Despite the plaintiffs’ suggestions that the court
subject the ordinance to strict scrutiny, the court nevertheless reviewed the
ordinance under rational basis.165  The court held that because the ordinance
failed even the most deferential of standards, the rational basis review, it was
not necessary to apply strict scrutiny, or even some intermediate level of scru-
tiny.166  The court found that the City of Las Vegas had a legitimate interest in
dealing with the problems associated with the “homeless occupation of [Hun-
tridge] Circle Park,” including “crime, drunkenness, littering, [and] drug use,”
among others.167  However, the court characterized the ordinance as “a blanket,
criminal prohibition against feeding poor individuals in a city park” that was
hybrid rights claim, or one involving both a free exercise claim and an additional constitu-
tionally protected right, strict scrutiny still applies. Id.
155 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
156 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 16, at 26.
157 Id. at 30.
158 Sacco v. City of Las Vegas, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL, at 1 (D. Nev. Jan. 26, 2007)
(order granting preliminary injunction).
159 Id. at 8, 23.
160 Id. at 8.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)).
164 Id. at 6-7, 23; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”).
165 Sacco, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL, at 9.
166 Id. at 10.
167 Id.
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not rationally related to the City’s legitimate interest.168  Ultimately, the court
held that the ordinance discriminated against individuals without providing a
clear legislative history evidencing a correlation with the underlying legitimate
government interest.169
Moreover, the court held that the ordinance violated neither the Free Exer-
cise nor Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment either facially, or as
applied to the plaintiffs.170  Although several of the plaintiffs alleged they were
“fulfilling a Christian tenet necessary for their spiritual redemption” by sharing
food and water with the homeless, the court held that the allegation alone was
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the City targeted religious practice
through the ordinance.171  The court also found the ordinance to be facially
neutral regarding the free exercise of religion because the Las Vegas City
Council was motivated not by animus for religion or a desire to restrict relig-
ious practice.172  Rather, the court found that the City was motivated by a
“desire to safeguard the public from rising crime associated with homeless
habitation of city parks.”173  The court again applied the more deferential
rational basis review and determined that, based on the City’s legitimate inter-
ests, the ordinance “easily survives rational basis review.”174
Finally, the court held that the ordinance did not violate the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment because the ordinance regulated non-expressive
conduct.175  The court found that the plaintiffs’ conduct was not inherently
expressive.176  Rather, conduct regulated by the ordinance was only expressive
within the context of the plaintiffs’ claims.177  Therefore, the plaintiffs’ facial
challenge of the ordinance failed because the ordinance did not “narrowly tar-
get inherently expressive conduct.”178  Moreover, the court found that the
plaintiffs’ challenge to the ordinance as applied similarly failed because the
ordinance did not prohibit other avenues of speech, such as chanting or carry-
ing a sign.179  Specifically, the court found that “without public and notorious
violation of the ordinance” or “related pamphlets, speeches and interviews that
gain[ ] any publicity for the Plaintiffs,” “the feeding of the homeless . . . draws
little public attention or publicity” to the plaintiffs’ messages “about homeless-
ness or war.”180  Furthermore, the court found that even if the plaintiffs’ con-
duct was expressive, the plaintiffs’ free speech rights were not without limits
168 Id.
169 Id. at 10-11.
170 Id. at 7; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech . . . .”).
171 Sacco, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL, at 11.
172 Id. at 12.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 15.
175 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”).
176 Sacco, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL, at 17.
177 Id. at 15.
178 Id. at 17.
179 Id. at 18.
180 Id.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-2\NVJ208.txt unknown Seq: 17  1-APR-08 13:15
756 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:740
and the ordinance was a valid time, place, and manner restriction.181  Thus, the
court found that the ordinance was content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve
the City’s significant interests, and left undisturbed adequate alternative chan-
nels of communication.182
B. Failure to Apply United States v. O’Brien
The Sacco court invokes O’Brien’s advice that incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms may lose out to an important governmental interest
in regulating non-speech.183  Yet, the Sacco court failed to apply O’Brien’s
four-part threshold test to determine whether the ordinance was sufficiently jus-
tified in limiting the plaintiffs’ freedom of speech rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment.  Instead, the Sacco court held that the ordinance was void both for
vagueness and on equal protection grounds.184  The O’Brien test applies to
conduct that combines elements of speech and non-speech.185  Moreover, the
Sacco court dismissed the plaintiffs’ contentions that the ordinance violated
their rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because
feeding the homeless was not inherently or patently expressive.186  However,
the record is rife with references to the various political motives underlying
several of the plaintiffs’ acts of feeding or sharing food with the homeless.187
Thus, even assuming that the act of feeding the homeless was not inher-
ently expressive for the purpose of a facial First Amendment attack on the
ordinance, the ordinance still violates several prongs of the O’Brien test.  The
O’Brien test is a conjunctive test, so the failure of the City of Las Vegas to
demonstrate compliance with any one of the four prongs would likely invali-
date the ordinance. O’Brien provides that an ordinance curtailing free speech
is sufficiently justified [when (1)] it is within the constitutional power of the Govern-
ment; [(2)] . . . it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [(3)] . . .
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [(4)]
if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.188
1. The Sacco Court Asserts a Substantial Government Interest That is
Not Supported in the Record.
The governmental interest cited by the Sacco court is not sufficiently sup-
ported in the ordinance’s legislative history.  The City Council devoted a por-
181 Id. at 21-22; see Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(“We have often noted that restrictions [on expressive conduct] are valid provided that they
are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alterna-
tive channels for communication of the information.”).
182 Sacco, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL, at 19-22.
183 Id. at 18 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
184 Id. at 8-9.
185 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
186 Sacco, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL, at 17-18.
187 See Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 16, at Exhibit 2 (declaration of Pat-
rick Band); id. (declaration of Robert Edmonds). See generally BUTLER & MCHENRY, supra
note 64.
188 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).
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tion of only one meeting to discussing the ordinance.189  It is questionable
whether the ordinance furthers a substantial government interest.  Moreover, it
is not clear that the City Council was sure of the problem that the ordinance
was allegedly designed to remediate.  The legislative history reveals that the
justification for the ordinance shifted depending on the circumstances.
On the day that the City Council unanimously voted to pass the ordinance,
City Attorney Brad Jerbic was the only individual to provide evidence purport-
edly supporting approval of the ordinance.190  Jerbic cited testimony from a
previous City Council Meeting, on June 21, 2006, at which the City heard from
service providers, law enforcement, and constituents, among a few others.191
At the June 21, 2006, council meeting, Duane Sonnenberg, Director of Grants
and Special Projects for the Salvation Army, described feedings similar to those
in Huntridge Circle Park.192  Sonnenberg observed feedings not at Huntridge
Circle Park, but in some other area of Las Vegas, across the street from where
other established service providers are located.193  Sonnenberg noted that when
the homeless arrived across the street from service providers for free meals, “it
was very dangerous crossing the street because those individuals who saw the
food wanted to be first in line, and without regard to traffic or safety, immedi-
ately charged across the street.”194  Moreover, Sonnenberg claimed that after
the feedings, there “was a significant amount of debris and residue left that
cluttered up the neighborhood because they did not have adequate trash bags or
trash cans to collect the food.”195  Furthermore, because those providing the
meals served them in Styrofoam containers, “the [homeless] would walk down
the street eating as they walked and [left the containers] wherever they
stopped.”196  Again, however, Sonnenberg testified not to his eyewitness obser-
vation of Huntridge Circle Park, but to another location elsewhere in Las
Vegas.197  Thus, citing testimony from one service provider at a previous city
council meeting, City Attorney Brad Jerbic, the only person to provide evi-
dence in support of the ordinance, articulated both a concern for the safety of
the homeless in crossing the street and the litter attendant to mobile feedings.198
Additionally, Jerbic extrapolated from the experience of Duane Sonnen-
berg and argued without any direct supporting evidence that after the feedings
189 See City Council Meeting, June 21, 2006, supra note 2.
190 City Council Meeting, July 19, 2006, supra note 15, Verbatim Excerpt, at 2 (testimony
of Brad Jerbic, City Attorney).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 3.
193 Id.
194 Id. (quoting City Council Meeting, June 21, 2006, supra note 2, Verbatim Excerpt, at 66
(testimony of Duane Sonnenberg, Director of Grants and Special Projects for the Salvation
Army)).
195
 City Council Meeting, June 21, 2006, supra note 2, Verbatim Excerpt, at 66 (testimony
of Duane Sonnenberg, Director of Grants and Special Projects for the Salvation Army).
196 City Council Meeting, July 19, 2006, supra note 15, Verbatim Excerpt, at 3 (testimony
of Brad Jerbic, City Attorney) (quoting City Council Meeting, June 21, 2006, supra note 2,
Verbatim Excerpt, at 66 (testimony of Duane Sonnenberg, Director of Grants and Special
Projects for the Salvation Army)).
197 Id. at 3.
198 Id. at 2-4.
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the homeless are “left behind without transportation.”199  Thus, the homeless
“end up in neighborhoods, not only leaving debris behind, but sometimes sleep-
ing on people’s yards, sometimes defecating, urinating on people’s yards.”200
Finally, Jerbic claimed that the homeless population was “being displaced from
where service providers can assist them with shelter, medical and other needs
to an area . . . where none of those services are available.”201  Thus, Jerbic,
based on another’s experiences unrelated to Huntridge Circle Park, argued that
citizens should not feed the homeless for their own good.
The Sacco court accepted Jerbic’s arguments as evidence of several signif-
icant and legitimate government interests that supported the ordinance.  The
court concluded that the ordinance served “significant government interests,”
which included “protecting the public from unsafe park conditions and trying to
most effectively help the homeless out of their plight.”202  Other “legitimate,
documented interests” that the court cites in support of the ordinance include,
“to encourage the feeding of the homeless in areas where social services are
available . . . [and] the protection of City parks and residential neighborhoods
from crime, noise, and pollution.”203  Further, “legitimate government inter-
est[s],” which the court cited in support of the ordinance, included the “crime,
drunkenness, littering, drug use, and other problems associated with homeless
occupation of Circle Park.”204  Moreover, the court claimed that “[t]he record
also establishes that it is best to treat the homeless population by steering them
towards service centers that can deal with both their hunger and other serious
problems.”205
2. The Ordinance Is More Restrictive Than Necessary to Further the
City’s Asserted Substantial Interest
The legislative history reveals that the City failed to correlate the existence
of homeless individuals in Huntridge Circle Park with the crimes occurring in
the surrounding neighborhood.  The City itself provided a wide array of mobile
services to the homeless in Huntridge Circle Park, including housing assistance
and referrals to drug and alcohol counseling.  However, the City Council over-
looked the fact that the City provided services in the park and perhaps the
homeless gravitated to the park because of those city-sponsored services, rather
than, or in addition to, the mobile food service.  Thus, the City failed to estab-
lish that the homeless were in the park for mobile food service and not for some
other, city-sponsored service.
Indeed, the district court included, at the end of the order, a section enti-
tled, “Guidance on Future Ordinances Addressing the Homeless Situation.”206
In this section, the court provided several guidelines, which presumably would
199 Id. at 4.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Sacco v. City of Las Vegas, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL, at 20 (D. Nev. Jan. 26, 2007)
(order granting preliminary injunction).
203 Id. at 14.
204 Id. at 10.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 22.
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assist the drafters of future legislation affecting the City’s homeless population
with creating ordinances that would not run afoul of the federal Constitution.
Thus, the court first noted that the “chief defect with the present ordinance is
that it is too broad.”207  Therefore, the court instructed the City to ensure that
future ordinances reflect a stronger correlation between “clearly articulated”
legislative history and the prohibited conduct.208  Specifically, the court noted
that an ordinance regulating group feedings would be constitutional if sup-
ported by a legislative record establishing that “continuous or overnight indi-
gent occupation of a park leads to increased crime and security issues, and the
record further reflects how the frequency and size of indigent group feedings
directly affects these problems.”209  Similarly, the court also stated that the City
was “free to draw upon previous legislative findings in the area of city food
regulation” because of the health risks associated with the transportation of
food to large groups.210
Although it failed to apply the O’Brien test, the Sacco court conceded that
the City “[did] not utilize the least restrictive means possible in pursuing the
City’s interests.”211  Specifically, the Sacco court explained that the City could
have prosecuted preexisting ordinances or passed new ordinances aimed at the
undesired behaviors attendant to homelessness.212  Moreover, the Sacco court
pointed to the ability of the City to enforce application and licensing ordinances
for food distribution and thereby address the health implications of large-scale
feedings.213  Additionally, City Attorney Brad Jerbic testified that “[the City
has] refused to issue citations for” “defecating in . . . bushes, . . . publicly
urinating, [and] . . . washing . . . clothes in [Huntridge Circle Park].”214
Even assuming that the City Council elicited testimony at its meeting on
June 21, 2006, as a means of supporting its asserted substantial interest in
enacting the ordinance, the testimony reveals that the City was similarly unable
to correlate the incidents of crime in the surrounding neighborhood with the
presence of the homeless in Huntridge Circle Park.  Moreover, the City failed
to demonstrate that mobile food service, and not the other services provided by
city-sponsored service providers, attracted the homeless to Huntridge Circle
Park.  The City heard testimony from a number of those individuals with a
stake in resolving the perceived homeless problem at Huntridge Circle Park.215
Much of the testimony related anecdotal tales supporting the notion of a home-
less invasion of the park.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 23.
210 Id.  In August of 2007, the District Court issued a Permanent Injunction against LVMC
13.36.055 because the “City has not modified the [unconstitutional] ordinance and stated at
oral argument that it had no intention of doing so.” See Sacco v. City of Las Vegas, Nos.
2:06-cv-0714-RCJ-LRL, 2:06-cv-0941-RCJ-LRL, 2007 WL 2429151, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug.
20, 2007).
211 Sacco, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL, at 21 (order granting preliminary injunction).
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 City Council Meeting, June 21, 2006, supra note 2, Verbatim Excerpt, at 78 (testimony
of Brad Jerbic, City Attorney).
215 See City Council Meeting, June 21, 2006, supra note 2.
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Deputy City Manager Orlando Sanchez presented crime data compiled by
the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”).216  In the nine
months prior to the City’s renovation of the park, approximately three-hundred
and fifty criminal acts occurred within a one-half mile radius of Huntridge Cir-
cle Park.217  However, he never provided evidence supporting the inference
that even one homeless individual was to blame for criminal activity in the
neighborhoods surrounding Huntridge Circle Park.  Sanchez only testified that
during the more than nine-month period during which the park was closed for
renovation, the crime rate dropped twenty-five percent, to approximately two-
hundred and fifty criminal acts.218  Sanchez noted, however, that in the nine-
month period after the City reopened the park, the crime rate rose by twenty-
five percent, to approximately three hundred criminal acts.219  Mayor Oscar
Goodman summed up Sanchez’s presentation of the crime data, stating that
“when the park is open, it would suggest that there’s more crime in the neigh-
borhood and therefore it would be the people who are in the park committing
those crimes.”220  Ultimately, the Mayor inferred that people who frequented
Huntridge Circle Park were probably responsible for criminal activities in the
surrounding neighborhood.  Nevertheless, the Mayor requested empirical data
from representatives of the Las Vegas city marshals and the LVMPD because
“if we’re going to point a finger at the [homeless], we better have some evi-
dence in fact the finger is being pointed correctly.”221  Later in the meeting,
however, Mayor Goodman opened the floor to the audience, telling one mem-
ber of the audience that he would “be happy to hear from [him],” if the audi-
ence member would “like to say something about the homeless that are in the
park that are destroying the quality of life of the residents.”222
Sanchez never explained the methodology underlying the collection of this
particular crime data.  The Las Vegas city marshals and the LVMPD have con-
current jurisdiction within the park.223  However, while the marshals enforce
city misdemeanors within parks, the LVMPD enforces state criminal statutes
but does not enforce city park rules or regulations.224  Moreover, the City does
not identify whether the total number of criminal acts comprises crimes
reported by citizens, arrests made by either the marshals or the LVMPD, or
whether the crime data contemplates both reports and arrests.  Furthermore, it is
unclear whether, assuming the crime data contemplates arrests, this figure
includes arrest made by the marshals or the LVMPD or both agencies.
City representatives testified to the fact that the City itself had a hand in
providing services to the homeless in Huntridge Circle Park.  Shannon West, a
social worker and Regional Homeless Coordinator for Southern Nevada, testi-
216 Id. (LVMPD Crime Data); id. Verbatim Excerpt, at 7 (testimony of Orlando Sanchez,
Deputy City Manager).
217 Id. Verbatim Excerpt, at 7 (testimony of Orlando Sanchez, Deputy City Manager).
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 8 (testimony of Oscar Goodman, Mayor).
221 Id. at 16.
222 Id. at 28.
223 Id. at 13 (testimony of Timothy Shattler, Deputy Chief, Las Vegas City Marshals).
224 Id. at 14.
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fied at the City Council Meeting on June 21, 2006.225  West testified that the
Southern Nevada Regional Planning Coalition, which is comprised of elected
officials from the cities of Boulder City, Henderson, Las Vegas, and North Las
Vegas, Clark County, members of the business community, and the Southern
Nevada Homeless Coalition, created a committee on homelessness.226  This
committee on homelessness is part of a regional response to homelessness in
Southern Nevada and lobbies the state government for funding to combat
chronic homelessness.227  According to West, a chronically homeless person is
any person homeless for more than a year or a person who has had four epi-
sodes of homelessness in a three-year period.228  In addition to the regional
approach, the City of Las Vegas, like other individual members of the commit-
tee on homelessness, maintains individual initiatives designed to address home-
lessness.229  West also testified about a program known as Mobile Crisis
Intervention, through which a consortium of direct service providers hired by
the regional committee on homelessness, working closely with law enforce-
ment, conduct mobile crisis intervention in the field.230  One of the areas ser-
viced by Mobile Crisis Intervention was Huntridge Circle Park.231
West testified that within Huntridge Circle Park, since approximately
December 2005 or January 2006, Mobile Crisis Intervention met with over one-
hundred “unique” individuals.232  Of these one-hundred unique individuals,
Mobile Crises Intervention provided “some type” of services to approximately
thirty-five people, ten of whom “met the criterion of the chronically home-
less.”233  These services included placement in housing or housing assistance,
treatment programs for drug or alcohol dependency, mental health services, and
transportation out-of-state.234  West also testified that just within the previous
two weeks, Clark County Social Service (“CCSS”) was at Huntridge Circle
Park “all the time.”235  Twenty-nine individuals that CCSS approached during
this two-week period accepted services while fifty-seven refused services.236
Ultimately, the Sacco court failed to apply the threshold O’Brien test to
determine whether the ordinance justifiably curtailed free speech guarantees.
The City failed to articulate a substantial, or even coherent, governmental inter-
est that justified enacting the ordinance.  Arguably, the City conducted only
two meetings in relation to the ordinance, one of which occurred before the
ordinance was even drafted.  The evidence proffered to the City Council was
anecdotal and, in some cases, based upon observations that occurred not at
Huntridge Circle Park, but at another Las Vegas location.  The City relied on
225 Id. at 17, 23 (testimony of Shannon West, a social worker and Regional Homeless Coor-
dinator for Southern Nevada).
226 Id. at 17-18.
227 Id. at 18.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 18, 20.
231 Id. at 20-21.
232 Id. at 18-21.
233 Id. at 21.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
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testimony proffered prior to the drafting of the ordinance.  Moreover, the ordi-
nance was more restrictive than necessary because the City had other tools at
its disposal that did not infringe free speech rights.  The City Attorney, Brad
Jerbic, testified that the City did not enforce ordinances prohibiting much of the
activity cited as attendant to the presence of homeless in the park.
C. Misapplication of Ward v. Rock Against Racism
The Sacco court correctly decided that the ordinance failed a constitu-
tional analysis as a time, place, and manner restriction.  The court was faithful
to the test elucidated by the United States Supreme Court in Clark, which con-
veys that in order to survive as a valid time, place, and manner restriction, the
ordinance must be “(1) content neutral; (2) narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant government interest; and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.”237  Ultimately, the Sacco court determined
that the ordinance was not a valid time, place, and manner restriction because
the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government inter-
est.238  However, the Sacco court erred in finding the ordinance to be content-
neutral because the ordinance is aimed at conduct that is not inherently expres-
sive.239  Specifically, the court held that “[t]he ordinance in this case presents a
classic case of a content neutral regulation.  It was not passed because of any
disagreement with the message Plaintiffs, or any other group, seek to convey
when they feed the homeless.”240
The legislative record undermines the court’s suggestion that the City
Council drafted a content-neutral ordinance.  The only reason the City created
the ordinance was to target individuals and groups that provided mobile food
service to the homeless in Huntridge Circle Park.  Moreover, the City never
considered a homeless problem in any other park.  Furthermore, the legislative
record contains direct references to groups that the Mayor and other members
of the City Council found contemptible based solely upon these groups’ politi-
cal and religious ideologies.
Thus, the Sacco court misapplied Ward’s test for content neutrality. Ward
provides that “[t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disa-
greement with the message it conveys.”241  The Las Vegas City Council explic-
itly disagreed with the plaintiffs’ message because the City failed to establish a
legislative history supporting its significant government interest in enacting the
ordinance.  The alleged secondary effects of homelessness attendant to large-
scale feedings in Huntridge Circle Park did not compel the City Council to pass
the ordinance unanimously, so much as the Council’s disdain for certain mem-
bers of the plaintiffs’ group did.  In fact, Mayor Goodman demonstrated his
disdain for at least one plaintiff on the record when, at the only hearing on the
237 Sacco v. City of Las Vegas, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL, at 19 (D. Nev. Jan. 26, 2007)
(order granting preliminary injunction) (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
238 Id. at 21.
239 Id. at 19-20.
240 Id. at 20.
241 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
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proposed ordinance, he asked, “Are there any members of . . . Food Not Bombs
who wanna tell ME why they’re anarchistic and atheistic?”242
Moreover, Mayor Goodman demonstrated his true feelings for the home-
less and the mobile service providers on several occasions, again at the only
public hearing on the proposed ordinance.  In response to testimony from one
audience member, Mayor Goodman relayed the following anecdote:  “[I]f any-
body’s passing by MLK and Charleston tonight on the . . . northwest corner,
there’s a woman who I see at Catholic Charities every day . . . she eats pretty
good.”243  Later, he elaborates that “at night, when I’m driving home, she’s
very hungry, and she’s got her sign and she’s all humpled [sic] over and crying
every night.”244  Thus, after one resident of the neighborhood related a story of
encountering a naked homeless man in the park, Mayor Goodman quipped,
“Maybe [that naked homeless man] . . . would take a tether ball and throw it
around his head.”245  Later, the Mayor pontificated, “I take offense with those
who choose [the homeless] lifestyle to the detriment of the neighborhood who
don’t have . . . mental problems . . . [or] physical problems, who just like to live
that life [of] non responsibility and defecate and urinate in people’s yards and
ruin their quality of life.”246
Mayor Goodman was not alone in his disdain for the homeless or their
providers.  Councilman Reese opined, “[W]hen we start feeding the homeless
away from providers, . . . once they get over [to Huntridge Circle Park] they
find a comfort level . . . [and] don’t have to go back . . . where they have to give
up their drugs and alcohol.”247  Later, Councilman Reese argued, “I always
wondered how . . . our Federal judges can say, we the taxpayers have no rights.
Those people that are out there causing the problems, they’re the one’s [sic] we
had to protect.”248  While not entirely explicit, Councilman Reese could hardly
mask his disdain for the homeless population in Huntridge Circle Park.
Ultimately, the Sacco court conducted a cursory review of an inadequate
legislative record.  The City failed to establish a significant, or even legitimate,
government interest to support enacting the ordinance.  Moreover, the scant
legislative history is replete with references that demonstrate the City Council’s
disdain for the plaintiffs’ group and the homeless to whom they provide mobile
services.  By failing to apply Ward’s test for content neutrality, the Sacco court
has not only undermined the plaintiffs’ free speech rights, but the court tacitly
approves the City’s illegitimate interests with its silence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Homelessness is a problem that has long plagued Huntridge Circle Park
and certainly the City of Las Vegas.  While the City owes a duty to those who
242 City Council Meeting, June 21, 2006, supra note 2, Verbatim Excerpt, at 27 (testimony
of Oscar Goodman, Mayor).
243 Id. at 29.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 30 (testimony of Beatrice Turner); id. at 34 (testimony of Oscar Goodman,
Mayor).
246 Id. at 53 (testimony of Oscar Goodman, Mayor).
247 Id. at 58 (testimony of Gary Reese, City Councilman).
248 Id. at 81.
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live, work, and own businesses in the neighborhoods surrounding the park to
ensure a certain quality of life, the City must endeavor to do so while ensuring
the First Amendment’s fundamental guarantee of the freedom of speech.  Like-
wise, the City must endeavor to meet the needs of the neighborhood’s residents
in a manner that avoids impermissible distinctions based upon the content of
speech or the viewpoint of the speaker.
The Sacco court heeded O’Brien’s advice that the important governmental
interest in regulating non-speech would overcome incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms.  However, it ultimately failed to apply O’Brien’s
four-part test for conduct combining elements of both speech and non-speech.
Instead, the Sacco court invalidated the ordinance for vagueness and Equal
Protection reasons, thus leaving open the door for the City to craft a new or
modified, and arguably unconstitutional, version of the ordinance.249  Ulti-
mately, it reached the correct decision while taking the wrong route.250
The Sacco court correctly decided that the ordinance failed constitutional
analysis as a time, place, and manner restriction.  It was faithful to Clark’s test
for the validity of a valid time, place, and manner restriction.251  The court
determined that the ordinance was not a valid time, place, or manner restriction
because the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
ment interest.252  Yet, the court erred in finding the ordinance to be content-
neutral.  Thus, the Sacco court misapplied Ward’s test for content neutrality.253
The scant legislative history supporting the ordinance demonstrates the Las
Vegas City Council explicitly disagreed with the plaintiffs’ message.  The
alleged secondary effects of homelessness attendant to large-scale feedings in
Huntridge Circle Park represented an end run around the Constitution’s prohi-
bition on impermissible legislative purpose.
249 Sacco v. City of Las Vegas, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL, at 23 (D. Nev. Jan. 26, 2007)
(order granting preliminary injunction).
250 See id. at 17-18.
251 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
252 Sacco, No. 2:06-cv-00714-RCJ-LRL, at 21.
253 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
